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We propose addressing the theme of this
special issue by examining the affective
responses that music evokes in the indi-
vidual. The logical first step is to enquire
how far these responses resemble natu-
ralistic emotions, i.e., those that are not
specifically musical, but have ordinary
non-musical content. The literature is
ambivalent on this. Many authors suggest
that whilst certain emotions are exclusive
to music (Scherer and Zentner, 2008),
there is considerable overlap between
“musical” and “naturalistic” emotions
(Zentner et al., 2008); others deny that
musically induced emotions are natu-
ralistic (Konecni, 2005, 2008), a view
elaborated by the nineteenth century critic
Eduard Hanslick (Hanslick, 1986; see also
Kivy, 2001, 2009; Zangwill, 2004, 2007,
2011).
Perhaps consideration of music’s ori-
gins might clarify the issue. If the uni-
versality of music in human society were
the consequence of biological selection
(Huron, 2001; Mithen, 2009), this would
support the naturalistic interpretation. If
music is, literally, in our DNA, then
human responses to music will form part
of the normal repertoire of emotions.
However, Patel (2008) has given reasons
for rejecting the evolutionary theory in
favor of the idea of music as “trans-
formative technology,” implying that it
is the outcome of cultural, not biologi-
cal evolution. An important recent study
has provided perhaps the first experimen-
tal evidence for this. Inspired by cultural
transmission theory (Boyd and Richerson,
1985), MacCallum et al. (2012) demon-
strated the effectiveness of consumer selec-
tion in generating music out of noise in
a Darwinian model of cultural evolution.
This suggests that music has evolved to
satisfy human aesthetic criteria, not vice
versa.
Moreover, the universality of music
goes hand in hand with an extraordinary
diversity, as MacCallum et al. point out
(the need to explain this being one of
the drivers for their study). Language’s
acknowledged genetic basis is associated
with deep structural similarities between
human languages. Yet the “languages”
of music have little in common cross-
culturally. Javanese gamelan music uses
two scales, both totally different from the
12 note Western scale (Patel, 2008, p. 19).
West African drum music employs a fea-
ture, the “time line,” unknown to Western
tradition (Agawu, 2006) and a rhythmic
structure which has “a richness and sub-
tlety found in no other music” (Temperley,
2000, p. 79). Japanese hogaku is “a music
erected upon such a different foundation
and animated by so different an aesthetic”
that it has essentially nothing in common
with the Western classical corpus (Dean,
1985, p. 147).
Taking the longitudinal view, and
focusing on just one musical sub-culture,
that of Western music, its development
during the past millenium from Gregorian
plainchant to modern electronic music
illustrates that the evolution of music
operates several orders of magnitude faster
than human evolution. Languages, by
comparison, show continuities in deep
structure that can be traced back 10,000
years and even beyond (Dunn et al.,
2005). The conclusion seems inescapable.
The evolutionary boot is on the other
foot: it is music that has evolved to fit
humans, not vice versa. But if human
responses to music are not the result of
biological evolution, the a priori argu-
ment that these affective responses must
correspond to naturalistic emotions falls
away.
On the other hand, Patel’s model not
only explains the speed and diversity of
musical development, but also suggests an
answer to our initial question. Borrowing
Patel’s analogy, humans migrating out of
Africa into Europe would have found
the warmth of fire a life-giving substi-
tute for the warmth of tropical sun-
shine, and the fact that it was not in
all respects identical with sunshine did
not detract from its value. For some pur-
poses the warmth of fire would have
proved superior: it does not induce sun-
burn, and one can cook with it. Similarly,
the emotional warmth induced by music
need not be identical with that pro-
vided by any natural emotion, and in
some respects the differences may enhance
its value: what we call the “sadness” in
music may strike us as so pleasant partly
because it does not induce real sadness in
listeners.
The outcome of the study reported in
Allen et al. (2013), though not designed
with this purpose, turns out to have a
bearing on the question. Matched adult
autism and control groups were compared
on the autonomic and cognitive compo-
nents of their emotional responses to a
standard list of music items (Quintin et al.,
2011).Whereas the groups responded sim-
ilarly at an autonomic level, they differed
at a cognitive level precisely as would
be expected if autonomic arousal causes
cognitive arousal. Regression analysis sug-
gested that the causal chain was medi-
ated by levels of type II alexithymia, or
the cognitive inability to interpret and
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verbalize the lower level autonomic or vis-
ceral aspects of emotion (this has high
comorbidity with autism: Berthoz and
Hill, 2005). The mediation interpreta-
tion was robust: levels of alexithymia,
and verbalization of emotion, also cor-
related significantly within the control
group.
How should we interpret this result?
If we assume as a working hypothesis
that affective responses to music are nat-
uralistic, it follows that they should be
activated via one or both of the two
principal routes to emotion induction,
the “fast” (thalamic) and “slow” (corti-
cal) routes (LeDoux, 2000). The fast route
rapidly alerts the autonomic nervous sys-
tem, priming the body to take immediate
action to cope with a potential emergency,
or opportunity; only subsequently are the
higher cognitive functions recruited, to
verify, elaborate, and possibly revoke the
fast track responses to an alert. With the
slow route, incoming sensory signals are
first appraised by the higher centers of the
brain; if found emotionally relevant, they
induce autonomic and bodily arousal. In
both cases, however, for the arousal to be
considered a naturalistic emotion, auto-
nomic and cognitive components must
both eventually be activated, and should
be congruent with one another.
The results from Allen et al. (2013),
in particular the mediation analysis,
appeared inconsistent with a naturalis-
tic slow track route for the induction of
musical emotions in our study. It might be
argued that this was because the individual
musical extracts were short (30 s): we have
no difficulty with accepting that higher
level cognitive processes, including such
mechanisms such as the ITPRA sequence
described by Huron (2006), are impor-
tant for the aesthetic aspects of musical
appreciation in extended listening, though
many cognitive effects may occur in as
brief a period as three seconds (Plazak and
Huron, 2011). The pleasure induced by
music activates normal dopamine reward
and anticipation circuits (Salimpoor et al.,
2011). However, this is irrelevant since
pleasure in general, and aesthetic pleasure
in particular, is not an emotion.
Juslin and Västfjäll (2008) propose six
mechanisms for emotion induction by
music (they exclude cognitive appraisal
from the outset, we think correctly).
These are brain stem reflexes, evaluative
conditioning, emotional contagion, visual
imagery, episodic memory, and musical
expectancy. Of these, the first and last have
been discussed above (in the “fast route,”
and the ITPRA mechanisms respectively).
Emotional contagion involves no appraisal
process and we would include it in our
fast route mechanism. Evaluative condi-
tioning and episodic memory both rely
on arbitrary associations, essentially inde-
pendent of any properties of the music.
In the case of visual imagery, Juslin
and Västfjäll cite no clear experimen-
tal evidence of any consistent causal link
between musical structure and particu-
lar visual images, let alone between music
and any emotions induced through that
mechanism.
We conclude that musical emotions,
if they are emotions at all in the con-
ventional sense, are fast track emotions.
With naturalistic fast track emotions, the
autonomic arousal component should be
complemented by the appropriate cog-
nitive counterpart. According to Huron
(2011), this is not the case, at least for
negative autonomic responses such as sad-
ness. Huron considers that the autonomic
system responds automatically to such
music with a kind of “sham pain,” but
we enjoy “sad” music because the con-
scious brain realizes that the situation is
not threatening, and responds with relief,
aided by the liberation of prolactin, so
that the net effect is pleasurable. If we
accept Huron’s ITPRA model, we may
plausibly speculate that a further effect
might be due to the combination in music
of a high degree of order and pattern,
and sufficient variety to make it unpre-
dictable. This acts as intellectual catnip
to the pattern detection and prediction
aspects of executive functioning. The anal-
ysis of these patterns may be sufficiently
interesting to, and demanding of, the
higher brain centers that they are dis-
tracted from their normal role in moni-
toring autonomic arousal, thus permitting
the arousal induced by the fast trackmech-
anism to persist in defiance of its lack of
congruence with reality. These processes
would enable the generation of patch-
work emotion states comprising activa-
tion of combinations of different brain
circuits not found in naturalistic emo-
tions. We might call these states “chimeri-
cal,” after the composite lion/goat/serpent
creature of Greek myth. They would be
sufficiently rewarding to make us wish to
repeat the listening experience, and this
could be a driver, in a model such as that
of MacCallum et al. (2012), for music to
evolve ways of generating ever more desir-
able chimerical combinations.
Two questions suggest themselves.
Firstly, if musical emotions are indeed
not naturalistic emotions, how can we
account for the stubbornly persistent illu-
sion that they are? Secondly, how is it
that music has the ability to induce such
powerful affective states, if indeed they
are unnatural? On the first question, we
have long known that experiencing the
physiological counterpart of an emo-
tion can lead to the brain’s attributing
the state to a naturalistic emotion even
when the cognitive counterpart is not
present (Schachter and Singer, 1962).
We suggest that this kind of unconscious
confabulation may be happening when
a listener is asked to describe their emo-
tional experiences, especially if there is
social pressure to feel the “appropriate”
emotions. Moreover, as pointed out in
Zentner et al. (2008), p. 494, some exper-
imental protocols embody a theory of
emotion developed outside music that
compels the use of standard emotion
words.
As to the second question, Juslin (2000,
2001) has argued that musical instruments
act as “superexpressive voices,” which
enhance and exaggerate the emotion-
ally expressive components of the human
voice. This theory is a perfect counter-
part, for music, to that of Ramachandran
and Hirstein (1999) in the visual arts,
with their notion of “supernormal stim-
uli” (though we should note that due
priority should be accorded to Aldous
Huxley: see his 1956 book “Heaven and
Hell”; also Allen and Heaton, 2010, p.
255). However, composers have an impor-
tant advantage over visual artists, who
cannot precisely control how viewers
scan an artwork, whereas listeners cannot
avoid hearing the notes in the intended
order: this allows for all the sophisti-
cated mechanisms for generating tension
and satisfying, or violating expectation
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as described in Huron’s ITPRA model
(Huron, 2006).
Concluding on a constructive note,
though affective responses to music may
lack validity as naturalistic emotions, they
are not for that reason valueless. Music
can undoubtedly influence mood, indeed
we know that mood management is one
of the main reasons people give for lis-
tening to music (North et al., 2004). It
is plausible that music has the ability to
vary mood states in a positive way along
both axes of the two-dimensional arousal
space described by Thayer (1978), lead-
ing to satisfying alterations of mood from
tense to calm, and from dull to excited.
Such uses were clearly described by partic-
ipants with autism in Allen et al. (2009):
see also Bhatara et al. (2010). Incidentally,
the lack of sophisticated emotion descrip-
tors cited in Allen et al. (2009) suggests,
in the light of the present paper, that our
participants were actually more insight-
ful into the true nature of their affective
responses to music than typically develop-
ing individuals, a nice reversal of the usual
representation of autism as a syndrome of
deficits.
It was proposed in Allen and Heaton
(2010) that the apparent preservation of
affective responses to music in neurodevel-
opmental disorders such as autism, might
be used as a means to repair the link
between autonomic and cognitive com-
ponents of emotion where this link is
damaged or underdeveloped. The sugges-
tion originated from the personal expe-
rience of the second author who had
found that autism, with its associated dif-
ficulties in learning about emotions via
the usual route of social interaction, did
not prevent the induction by music of
intense affective states, in an unthreaten-
ing context, which led to a better under-
standing of naturalistic emotions. A pilot
study under the auspices of the Baily
Thomas Charitable Fund currently being
conducted by the first author is explor-
ing whether associative learning can be
used to help people with type II alex-
ithymia by teaching them, via musical
extracts, to attach cognitive labels to their
autonomic arousal states. Very preliminary
results suggest that our procedure does
producemeasurable benefits (pending for-
mal publication, some further details of
the study can be found online: Allen et al.,
2012). Musical emotions possess some of
the characteristics of naturalistic emotions
and lack others, and we suggest that it is
this dual nature which may make them
useful in treating conditions where emo-
tional processing is partially preserved,
and partially disrupted. If this viewpoint
is correct, then their value in this con-
text is precisely because, like individuals
with autism, they are both the same and
different.
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